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INTRODUCTION 
Because no federal statute expressly prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
(LGB) persons have long argued that anti-LGB bias should be actionable 
under Title VII as a form of sex discrimination.1  This contention has 
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 1.  See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(observing that in three cases consolidated for appeal, the plaintiffs collectively argued “that 
in prohibiting certain employment discrimination on the basis of ‘sex,’ Congress meant to 
include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”). 
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generally been met with skepticism by courts, with judges often relying on a 
narrow, biologically-based definition of “sex” and Congress’ repeated 
failure to pass LGB-inclusive nondiscrimination legislation as confirmation 
that Title VII does not afford a cause of action to LGB persons.2  The U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), moreover, 
historically has taken the position that sexual orientation discrimination does 
not constitute sex discrimination for the purposes of Title VII.3  Yet, in a 
remarkable about-face, the EEOC recently reversed course and held that 
Title VII does in fact prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s 
sexual orientation. 
In Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC concluded that “sexual orientation is 
inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’” such that “an allegation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex 
discrimination under Title VII.”4  The EEOC identified three possible 
evidentiary routes by which LGB plaintiffs may prove that the relevant 
conduct constituted actionable sex discrimination:  first, the discrimination 
involved treatment that would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex 
(the but-for route); second, the discrimination was premised on the 
fundamental sex stereotype that individuals should be physically and 
emotionally attracted only to persons of the opposite sex (the gender-
stereotyping route); and third, the discrimination was based on the sex of the 
persons with whom the individual associates (the associational-
discrimination route).5  The EEOC has advanced the foregoing evidentiary 
routes in two lawsuits in which it is serving as the plaintiff6 as well as in 
several additional cases where the EEOC has submitted friend-of-the-court 
briefs.7 
 
 2.  See Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 290 (2014) (noting 
that “[c]ourts initially commandeered decisions holding that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of ‘transsexualism’ to dismiss discrimination claims brought by 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.”). 
 3.  E.g., Johnson v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 05910858, 1991 WL 1189760, at *3 
(EEOC Dec. 19, 1991). 
 4.  EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (EEOC July 15, 2015). 
 5.  Id. at *10. 
 6.  See EEOC v. Scott Med. Ctr., 2017 WL 5493975 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017) (entering 
a Judgment Order for plaintiff); see also EEOC v. Pallet Co., No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md. 
June 28, 2016) (entering parties’ consent decree). 
 7.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of 
Plaintiff/Appellant and Reversal at 10-23, Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195 
(2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-748) [hereinafter Christiansen Amicus Brief]; Brief of the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and in 
Favor of Reversal at 11-24, Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 
15-15234) [hereinafter Evans Amicus Brief]; Brief of the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Hively’s Petition for Rehearing and 
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 5-9, Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 2016 WL 6768628 
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This Article examines the associational-discrimination route as a means 
of securing employment protections for LGB persons and concludes that the 
approach should be abandoned in favor of the but-for and gender-
stereotyping routes.  Compared to these latter routes, the associational-
discrimination route has three major flaws.  First, although the circuit courts 
are uniform in holding that race-based associational discrimination is 
actionable under Title VII,8 the notion of associational sex discrimination has 
been recognized by only one circuit, and that court’s reasoning is highly 
suspect.9  The Supreme Court, moreover, has never recognized the validity 
of associational discrimination theory in any context, race or otherwise.10  
Consequently, in asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is 
prohibited as a form of associational sex discrimination, plaintiffs are asking 
courts to untether the concept of associational discrimination from its racial 
moorings, expand the theory to include associational discrimination on the 
basis of sex, and then interpret associational sex discrimination as precluding 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  For many courts, this 
argument will likely prove a bridge too far. 
Second, plaintiffs seeking to contest sexual orientation discrimination 
as associational sex discrimination will likely have difficulty accessing the 
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.11  The 
experiences of the first Caucasian plaintiffs to assert claims of associational 
race discrimination are instructive.  Courts once regarded Caucasian 
plaintiffs’ allegations of associational race discrimination as disingenuous 
attempts to exploit the protected class status of their African-American 
associates.12  These courts routinely chastised Caucasian plaintiffs for 
seeking to assert claims that were merely derivative of racial bias against 
African-Americans.13  Although today it is generally understood that if a 
 
(7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1720) [hereinafter Hively Amicus Brief]. 
 8.  Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); Tetro v. Elliott Popham 
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1998); Drake 
v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the 
World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 9.  See infra pp. 33-41. 
 10.  Depaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador, No. 14-CV-252, 2015 WL 12751708, at *6 (D. 
N.M. Jan. 27, 2015). 
 11.  411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 12.  See Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. C-83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *2 (N.D. 
Ga. June 15, 1983) (stating that “[t]he court therefore finds that [the Caucasian] plaintiff is 
attempting to state a claim under Title VII based on the race of his [African-American] 
wife.”). 
 13.  See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 209-10 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (finding 
that “[w]hile the Court does not impugn the motives of the plaintiff, a holding which would 
permit a white plaintiff to attack practices which allegedly disadvantage blacks would open 
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Caucasian employee “is subjected to adverse action because an employer 
disapproves of interracial association, the [Caucasian] employee suffers 
discrimination because of the employee’s own race,”14 courts adjudicating 
LGB plaintiffs’ claims of associational sex discrimination may default to the 
reasoning of these earlier cases and hold that LGB plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
the first element of McDonnell Douglas Corp. to the extent they are 
ostensibly seeking to invoke the protected class status of their same-sex 
associates. 
Third, the associational-discrimination route stands to be under-
inclusive.  To date, most of the cases finding an actionable claim of 
associational discrimination have centered on relationships of a romantic or 
familial nature between an associator and a specific associatee.15  Should this 
trend carry over into the sexual orientation context, persons discriminated 
against solely on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation 
would lack any recourse under Title VII given that the discrimination they 
suffered was status-based rather than the result of their intimate association 
with an individual of a particular sex.  This would have the practical effect 
of conferring privileged status on persons in sexual orientation-consistent 
relationships, notwithstanding the fact that an individual’s sexual orientation 
and the sex of the persons to whom they are attracted would seem to be 
inexorably intertwined.  LGB persons, moreover, would be especially 
vulnerable given that many of them are not out at work and thus cannot 
acknowledge their involvement in a same-sex relationship to their 
colleagues, a prerequisite to invoking the protections of associational 
discrimination theory.16 
Unlike associational discrimination, the but-for and gender-
stereotyping routes are grounded in Supreme Court precedent and have their 
origins in the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.17  Because the 
inclusion of associational discrimination claims will only serve to undermine 
these other arguments’ strength while introducing unnecessary confusion 
into courts’ analyses, this article contends the EEOC and private litigants 
 
Title VII to dangerous abuse” given that a Caucasian plaintiff would have “no personal 
incentive to enforce the Act” but may instead have “an incentive to subvert [Title VII].”). 
 14.  Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 15.  Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 16.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, The Cost of the Closet and the Rewards of 
Inclusion, 9 (2014). 
 17.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (recognizing the 
gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination); City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding sex discrimination where “the evidence shows 
‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different’” 
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1205 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting))). 
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should rely exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes to 
prove that anti-LGB bias constitutes actionable sex discrimination.  Part I 
considers the literature’s treatment of associational sex discrimination 
generally and its implications for LGB persons specifically.  Part II examines 
the EEOC’s initial rejection and subsequent recognition of associational sex 
discrimination as a means of contesting sexual orientation bias in the 
workplace.  Part III demonstrates that associational sex discrimination 
suffers from several major shortcomings, rendering it an imperfect vehicle 
for securing sexual orientation-based employment protections.  Part IV 
contends that the associational-discrimination route should be abandoned in 
favor of the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes given that these latter 
methods are consistent with and reflective of established legal norms in the 
area of sex discrimination. 
I. ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE ACADEMIC 
LITERATURE 
The literature’s treatment of associational sex discrimination as a means 
of redressing sexual orientation-based employment bias has been relatively 
limited, with authors often pausing just long enough to note the theoretical 
viability of such claims before returning to their primary theses.18  The dearth 
of scholarly discourse in this area had the effect of relegating associational 
sex discrimination to an academic afterthought throughout much of the 
1990s and early 2000s, notwithstanding the corresponding surge in LGB-
oriented legal scholarship over that same timeframe.19  Indeed, it was not 
until 2012 that a scholar by the name of Victoria Schwartz undertook a 
serious examination of associational discrimination theory’s implications for 
LGB persons, and her seminal piece — Title VII: A Shift from Sex to 
Relationships20 — remains one of only a handful of articles to be published 
 
 18.  E.g., Mark W. Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Comment, Third-Party Associative 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REV. 913, 928 (2001) (discussing briefly the 
possibility of third-party associative discrimination claims based on same-sex partners before 
returning to the main discussion of race based discrimination).  But see Matthew Clark, 
Comment, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: 
The Legal Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313 (2003) 
(providing a comparatively more thorough exploration of associational discrimination 
theory’s implications for sexual orientation-based employment bias). 
 19.  See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and 
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 351 (1995) (“These . . . writings have produced a virtual explosion 
of ideas in just a few years, creating a rich and expanding body of sexual orientation discourse 
and scholarship for the first time in the history of American legal academia.”). 
 20.  Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 209 (2012). 
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in this area to date.21 
Professor Schwartz begins her article by suggesting that the text of Title 
VII is ambiguous insofar as associational discrimination is concerned.22  In 
relevant part, Title VII provides “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”23  
Schwartz contends that the foregoing passage is susceptible to two plausible 
interpretations.24  Under the first reading, discrimination must be predicated 
on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin independent 
of and without reference to the individual’s interpersonal relationships.25  
Under the second reading, discrimination may be based on an individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin when considered in relation to 
and as informed by their interpersonal associations.26  Schwartz, therefore, 
rejects the premise that associational discrimination theory is merely an ad 
hoc judicial construct and instead argues that a relationally-oriented reading 
of the passage is “entirely consistent with the text of Title VII.”27 
After acknowledging that associational discrimination theory 
originated and developed within the specific context of race discrimination, 
Schwartz asserts there is nothing in Title VII’s text to suggest the theory 
should be limited to the category of race:  “[T]he statutory language ‘because 
of such individual’s’ applies to each of the protected characteristics [set forth 
in Title VII, meaning] the relational discrimination interpretation of that 
phrase ought to apply equally to [the statute’s] other protected 
characteristics . . . .”28  According to Schwartz, once courts recognize the 
applicability of associational discrimination theory to claims of sex 
discrimination, they necessarily must conclude that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation:  “[S]exual orientation is an 
inherently relational concept” in that a woman discriminated against for 
being gay:  
“is discriminated against for her sex (female) in relation to her 
sexual relationships with others (female).  Therefore, her claim for 
discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation is necessarily 
a claim that she is being discriminated against on the basis of her 
 
 21.  E.g., Pierce G. Hand, IV, Note, Affiliative Discrimination Theory: Title VII Litigation 
Within the Sixth Circuit, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541 (2016) (contending the Sixth Circuit 
should recognize sexual orientation discrimination as associational sex discrimination). 
 22.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 216. 
 23.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 24.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 216. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 221 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)). 
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sex when viewed in relation to others.”29 
The expansive view of associational discrimination endorsed by 
Professor Schwartz is further apparent from her contention that a person need 
not be in a sexual orientation-consistent relationship at the time of the alleged 
discrimination to state a cognizable claim of associational sex 
discrimination.30  She contends that “[a]n employer who is motivated by 
animus based on an employee’s sexual orientation likely is so motivated 
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s relationships.”31  
According to Schwartz, it is the employee’s romantic association with 
persons of the same sex generally rather than his or her relationship with any 
individual specifically that is likely to engender animus on the part of the 
employer.32  Schwartz, therefore, believes that associational sex 
discrimination stands to provide meaningful employment protections to all 
persons discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, not just 
those fortunate enough to be in romantic relationships at the time of the 
discriminatory act.33 
As discussed in Part III, however, Professor Schwartz ostensibly 
provides an unduly optimistic assessment of associational sex discrim-
ination’s potential efficacy in redressing sexual orientation-based 
employment bias.  First, courts will likely be hesitant to extend associa-tional 
discrimination theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to include 
matters of sex, much less construe associational sex discrimination as 
precluding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  Second, courts 
adjudicating claims of associational sex discrimination will likely deny LGB 
persons access to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, 
meaning direct proof of discrimination will be necessary to state a cognizable 
Title VII claim.  Third, courts will likely restrict associational sex 
discrimination claims to persons who were known by their coworkers to be 
in committed romantic relationships at the time of the alleged discrimination, 
leaving single and closeted LGB individuals without any recourse.  Before 
examining the associational-discrimination route’s shortcomings in detail, 
however, it is important to understand the theory’s evolution within the 
EEOC. 
 
 29.  Id. at 248.  Whereas Schwartz’s analysis focuses exclusively on sexual orientation 
discrimination directed against LGB persons, she makes a point to note that claims of 
associational sex discrimination stand to be available to persons of all sexual orientations, 
including heterosexuals.  Id. at 250. 
 30.  Id. at 249. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
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II. THE EEOC AND ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION 
For decades, neither the EEOC nor the courts had cause to consider the 
application of associational discrimination theory in the specific context of 
sex.34  When the EEOC was finally confronted with the issue in Cooke v. 
Nicholson, the Commission’s analysis was complicated by the fact the 
complainant/associator was a heterosexual man whereas the relevant 
associatee was a homosexual woman.35  This initially led to the dismissal of 
the complainant’s case on the grounds the harassment the complainant 
suffered was predicated on the associatee’s sexual orientation rather than her 
sex.36  On appeal, the complainant argued that he had been harassed because 
he was willing to work with the only female in what was otherwise an all-
male environment such that the associatee’s homosexuality was irrelevant 
for the purposes of his associational discrimination claim.37  The 
Commission, nevertheless, affirmed the final order dismissing the 
complainant’s case38 and denied his subsequent request for reconsideration.39 
Approximately one year later, the Commission sua sponte reconsidered 
Cooke and held that claims of associational sex discrimination are cognizable 
under Title VII.40  The Commission began by observing that Title VII does 
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation 
and noted that at least some of the harassment the complainant endured 
appeared to be the result of his association with a gay co-worker.41  As an 
example, the Commission cited complainant’s receipt of a note implying that 
he was gay and complainant’s belief the note stemmed from his cordial 
relationship with a homosexual colleague.42  Conversely, the Commission 
recognized that some of the harassment directed against the complainant was 
the product of his association with a female co-worker, as reflected in the 
rumors that he and the associatee were having a sexual affair.43  The case, 
therefore, posed two interrelated questions: whether a sex discrimination 
claim may be predicated on associational discrimination theory and, if so, 
 
 34.  Andrew W. Powell, Is There a Future for Sex-Based Associational Discrimination 
Claims Under Title VII?, LAB. LAW J. 9349634, 164, 166-68 (Fall 2015). 
 35.  Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 05A60305, 2006 WL 842209, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 23, 
2006). 
 36.  Id. at *2-3. 
 37.  Id. at *3. 
 38.  Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 01A51683, 2005 WL 1073710, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 29, 
2005). 
 39.  Cooke v. Nicholson, No. 05A50929, 2005 WL 2428941, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 22, 
2005). 
 40.  Cooke, 2006 WL 842209, at *4. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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whether such claims are rendered inactionable when accompanied by 
instances of sexual orientation discrimination.  Answering yes and no, 
respectively, the Commission found that “if harassment was simultaneously 
directed against the complainant both because of his association with [the 
female associatee] because of her sexual orientation and gender, Title VII 
still protects the gender basis.”44 
Notwithstanding the Commission’s decision in Cooke, courts have been 
hesitant to recognize claims of associational sex discrimination.45  Some 
courts have intimated that while such claims may be cognizable in theory, 
they fail as a practical matter.46  Other courts have cited a reluctance to confer 
employment protections on LGB persons as their reason for rejecting 
associational sex discrimination claims:  “[T]he . . . novel theory that all 
associational sex discrimination is barred as the analogue of interracial 
relationship discrimination . . . proves too much and must be rejected” given 
that “[a]dopting such a theory would serve to protect sexual orientation in 
any context where sex discrimination is protected . . . .”47  Significantly, in 
the decade following Cooke only one claim of associational sex 
discrimination was able to withstand a defendant’s summary judgment 
motion and only because the court implicitly assumed that both the male 
associator and the female associatee were heterosexual.48  Thus, courts’ 
resistance to allowing claims of associational sex discrimination post-Cooke 
was attributable — at least in part — to continuing concerns that recognition 
of such claims would lead to protections for LGB persons.49 
Ostensibly seeking to reinvigorate associational discrimination theory 
within the courts while at the same time endeavoring to eliminate workplace 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in 2015 the EEOC 
 
 44.  Id. (citing Sexton v. Slater, No. 05970111, 1999 WL 433295 (E.E.O.C. June 17, 
1999)). 
 45.  Powell, supra note 34, at 169. 
 46.  See Gallo v. W.B. Mason Co., No. 10-10618-RWZ, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1 (D. 
Mass. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Assuming, arguendo, that Title VII prohibits gender-based 
associational discrimination, Gallo’s complaint falls [sic] to state such a claim.”); Stezzi v. 
Aramark Sports, LLC, No. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866, at *5 (E.D. Penn. July 30, 2009) 
(“Here, there are . . . insufficient facts to persuade this Court to extend an associational 
discrimination claim to the gender context.”). 
 47.  Partners Healthcare Sys. v. Sullivan, 497 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 48.  Pratt v. Hustedt Chevrolet, No. 05-4148, 2009 WL 805128 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 
2009).  See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 254 (“[T]he district court accepted the relational 
discrimination argument in the [presumably] heterosexual sexual orientation context, and was 
able to avoid the bootstrapping arguments and legal stigma that would be triggered had the 
plaintiff been homosexual.”). 
 49.  See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“It is clear . . . that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).  
See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 234-46 (discussing courts’ various rationales for 
concluding that sexual orientation discrimination is outside the purview of Title VII). 
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announced that sexual orientation discrimination is actionable under Title 
VII as a form of associational sex discrimination.50  Specifically, in Baldwin 
v. Foxx the Commission held that: 
Sexual orientation discrimination is . . . sex discrimination 
because it is associational discrimination on the basis of sex.  That 
is, an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is alleging that his or her employer took his or her sex 
into account by treating him or her differently for associating with 
a person of the same sex.  For example, a gay man who alleges that 
his employer took an adverse employment action against him 
because he associated with or dated men states a claim of sex 
discrimination under Title VII; the fact that the employee is a man 
instead of a woman motivated the employer’s discrimination 
against him.  Similarly, a heterosexual man who alleges a gay 
supervisor denied him a promotion because he dates women 
instead of men states an actionable Title VII claim of 
discrimination because of his sex.51 
The Commission indicated that the prohibition of sexual orientation 
discrimination was a logical extension of its earlier decisions finding that 
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s interracial relationships 
constitutes actionable race discrimination, reasoning that “Title VII ‘on its 
face treats each of the enumerated categories’ — race, color, religion, sex, 
and national origin — ‘exactly the same.’”52  The Commission concluded by 
asserting that “sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ 
and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily 
an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”53 
Whereas Baldwin only applies to the federal workforce,54 the 
Commission has endeavored to extend the decision’s reach to the private 
sector by filing two lawsuits challenging sexual orientation discrimination as 
associational sex discrimination.55  In EEOC v. Scott Medical Center, the 
Commission alleged that a male supervisor sexually harassed a gay 
subordinate because he “objected generally to males having romantic and 
sexual association with other males, and objected specifically to [the 
 
 50.  Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). 
 51.  Id. at *6. 
 52.  Id. at *6-7 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243 n.9). 
 53.  Id. at *5. 
 54.  Ryan H. Nelson, Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title VII After Baldwin 
v. Foxx, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 255, 256 (2015). 
 55.  Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits 
Challenging Sexual Orientation Discrimination as Sex Discrimination (Mar. 1, 2016), 
available at https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma. cc/V
9G5-8P7F]. 
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subordinate’s] close, loving relationship with his male partner.”56  Similarly, 
in EEOC v. Pallet Companies, the Commission alleged that a male 
supervisor sexually harassed a lesbian subordinate because he “objected 
generally to females having romantic and sexual association with other 
females, and objected specifically to [the subordinate’s] close, loving 
association with her female partner.”57  Although Pallet Companies 
ultimately settled,58 Scott Medical Center resulted in a $55,500 judgment for 
the plaintiff, but only after the defendant accepted a default judgment on the 
question of liability.59 
As amicus curiae, moreover, the EEOC has advocated the associational-
discrimination route in three circuits60 wherein sexual orientation 
discrimination has previously been deemed permissible under Title VII.61  In 
its briefs, the Commission argues that the relevant circuit precedent is 
outdated and unworkable.62  The Commission also contends that “[t]he 
behavior of an employer that discriminates against a gay employee because 
it disapproves of same-sex dating is not materially different from the 
behavior of an employer that discriminates against an employee because it 
disapproves of interracial dating,” given that “[i]n both cases, the employer 
bases its actions on the protected characteristic of its employee, viewed in 
relation to the individuals with whom that employee associates.”63  To date, 
however, only one of the three aforementioned circuits has embraced 
associational discrimination theory as a means by which LGB persons may 
contest  sexual orientation-based employment discrimination,64 and that 
 
 56.  Complaint at 4-5, No. 2:16-cv-225-CB (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016). 
 57.  Complaint at 5, No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2016). 
 58.  EEOC v. Pallet Cos., No. 1:16-cv-595-CCB (D. Md. June 28, 2016) (order entering 
parties’ consent decree). 
 59.  EEOC v. Scott Med. Ctr., No. 2:16-cv-225-CB (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017).  
Separately, the associational-discrimination route has been endorsed by one U.S. circuit court.  
Hively, 853 F.3d at 347-49. 
 60.  Hively Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 6-7; Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7, 
at 18-20; Evans Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 19-22. 
 61.  See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[H]arassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation (and 
not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Title VII does not prohibit harassment or 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 
(5th Cir. 1979) (“Discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 
1981.”).  Note that decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior to September 30, 1981 constitute 
binding precedent within the Eleventh Circuit.  Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 
1209 (11th Cir. 1981). 
 62.  Hively Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 4; Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 
10. 
 63.  Christiansen Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 20. 
 64.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 347-49.  Three-judge panels of the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
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court’s reasoning is predicated on a false equivalence as discussed in greater 
detail in Part III. 
III. ASSOCIATIONAL SEX DISCRIMINATION:  AN IMPERFECT 
MEANS OF REDRESSING SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED 
EMPLOYMENT BIAS 
Compared to the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes, the 
associational-discrimination route stands to be over complex and under 
inclusive as a means of redressing sexual orientation-based employment 
bias.  First, courts will likely be hesitant to expand associational 
discrimination theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to combat 
instances of sexual orientation discrimination.  Second, plaintiffs seeking to 
contest sexual orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex 
discrimination will likely have difficulty accessing the burden-shifting 
framework of McDonnell Douglas.  Third, courts willing to entertain claims 
of associational sex discrimination will likely limit such claims’ scope to 
persons who were in committed romantic relationships at the time of the 
alleged discrimination.  The EEOC and LGB plaintiffs should, therefore, 
abandon the associational-discrimination route as a means of contesting 
sexual orientation-based employment bias given that the inclusion of 
associational discrimination claims will only serve to detract from the but-
for and gender-stereotyping routes’ strengths while at the same time 
affording courts hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to curtail the 
associational-discrimination route’s efficacy via narrow, fact-restrictive 
rulings.65 
 
rejected LGB plaintiffs’ claims of associational sex discrimination after concluding that such 
claims were barred by circuit precedent.  Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 
199 (2d Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 16-748 (2d Cir. June 28, 2017); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l 
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, No. 15-15234-BB (11th Cir. July 
6, 2017), petition for cert. filed, 2017 WL 4022788 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017) (No. 17-370). 
 65.  The “strategic” manner in which courts have sought to limit LGB persons’ otherwise 
actionable claims of sex discrimination is well-documented.  See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 19, 
at 24 (“[C]ourts can and do (re)characterize sex and gender discrimination as sexual 
orientation discrimination virtually at will.  This practice employs sexual orientation to create 
a loophole for sex and gender biases . . . .”).  See also Alex Reed, Same-Sex Harassment After 
Boh Brothers, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 441, 456-57 (2016) (observing that courts adjudicating 
same-sex harassment claims have endeavored to limit the gender-stereotyping theory to the 
facts of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins); Alex Reed, A Pro-Trans Argument for a 
Transexclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 835, 852-53 (2013) 
(acknowledging that although the gender-stereotyping theory “would seem to afford the 
transgender community a ready means of securing employment protections under Title VII,” 
courts historically have sought to limit the theory to the facts of Price Waterhouse).  
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A. Expanding Coverage Beyond Race 
Whereas the circuits are uniform in holding that race-based 
associational discrimination is actionable under Title VII,66 the concept of 
associational sex discrimination has been embraced by only one circuit,67 and 
that court’s reasoning is highly suspect.68  The Supreme Court, moreover, 
has never explicitly recognized the validity of associational discrimination 
theory in any Title VII context, race or otherwise.69  Consequently, in 
asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited as a form of 
associational sex discrimination, plaintiffs are asking courts to untether 
associational discrimination theory from its racial moorings, expand the 
theory to include discrimination on the basis of sex, and then interpret 
associational sex discrimination as precluding discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  For many courts, this argument will likely prove a bridge 
too far.70 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in DeSantis v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. is instructive.71  Appellants in that case were a 
group of LGB persons alleging they had been subjected to associational sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.72  As paraphrased by the court, 
“[a]ppellants argue that the EEOC has held that discrimination against an 
employee because of the race of the employee’s friends may constitute 
discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII” and “contend that 
 
 66.  See supra note 8. 
 67.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.  The chief judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has 
endorsed the associational-discrimination route in a concurrence, however.  Christiansen, 852 
F.3d at 204 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring).  Separately, the associational-discrimination route 
has been endorsed by two district courts.  E.g., Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp. 
3d 255, 268 (D. Conn. 2016); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193-94 
(M.D. Ala. 2015). 
 68.  See infra pp. 33-41. 
 69.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex 
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 356 (2017) 
(observing the Supreme Court did “not explicitly rely on the associational discrimination 
argument” in a 1983 case involving sex discrimination but noting that “lower court decisions 
since 1975 have all but uniformly interpreted Title VII to regulate discrimination because of 
the race or ethnicity of one’s intimate associates”). 
 70.  See Partners Healthcare Sys., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (“[T]he . . . novel theory that all 
associational sex discrimination is barred as the analogue of interracial relationship 
discrimination . . . proves too much and must be rejected” given that “[a]dopting such a theory 
would serve to protect sexual orientation in any context where sex discrimination is protected, 
including under Title VII and Amendment XIV analysis.”).  See also Luke A. Boso, Acting 
Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual Orientation Stereotyping, 83 TENN. L. REV. 575, 600-01 (2016) 
(“What seems to trouble courts . . . is the number of links in the causal chain necessary to 
arrive at the conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination.”). 
 71.  608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 72.  Id. at 331. 
REED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:10 PM 
744 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
analogously discrimination because of the sex of the employees’ sexual 
partner should constitute discrimination based on sex.”73  Although the Ninth 
Circuit was prepared to “assum[e] that it would violate Title VII for an 
employer to discriminate against employees because of the gender of their 
friends,” the court declined to construe associational sex discrimination as 
encompassing appellants’ claims of sexual orientation discrimination.74 
Commentators have criticized DeSantis as deliberately distorting the 
appellants’ claims in order to conclude that Title VII does not protect LGB 
persons.  Matthew Clark, for example, contends that “[b]y mischaracterizing 
the associati[onal] discrimination theory as an inquiry into the sex of an 
employee’s ‘friends,’ the Ninth Circuit . . . missed the point.”75  He explains 
that to prevail on an associational discrimination claim, plaintiffs “generally 
must show a very substantial relationship with the other person that is greater 
than friendship.”76  Separately, Victoria Schwartz notes that “while the 
court’s language is reminiscent of [associational] discrimination arguments, 
its analysis shows that it misses the essence of those arguments.”77  Schwartz 
explains that “it is not the sex of the third party that is the focus of the 
analysis, but rather the sex of the employee viewed vis-à-vis the third party” 
such that “[t]he Ninth Circuit never considers, much less rejects, this 
properly understood [associational] discrimination argument.”78 
Whereas these scholars’ criticisms are justified from a purely academic 
standpoint, their contentions are irrelevant for the purposes of this Article.  
DeSantis may be read as standing for one of two distinct propositions: 
associational sex discrimination — by definition — does not encompass 
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s same-sex romantic 
relationships; or courts are so averse to providing redress for sexual 
orientation-based employment discrimination that they are prepared to 
mischaracterize LGB plaintiffs’ otherwise actionable claims of associational 
sex discrimination.  Under either interpretation, DeSantis highlights the risks 
of advancing associational discrimination theory as a means of contesting 
anti-LGB employment bias. 
The associational-discrimination route’s flaws are evident not only in 
the cases rejecting the route, but also in the cases embracing it.  To date, the 
only court to permit an explicit claim of associational sex discrimination is 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the opacity of the court’s analysis 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Clark, supra note 18, at 333-34. 
 76.  Id. at 334. 
 77.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 252. 
 78.  Id. 
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suggests the theory is ill-suited for application in areas other than race.79  In 
finding that the lesbian plaintiff stated a viable claim of discrimination on 
the basis of her intimate association with a person of the same sex, the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it had never before been confronted with 
a claim of associational discrimination in any context, race or otherwise.80  
The majority in Hively, nevertheless, proceeded to embrace a sweeping view 
of associational discrimination whereby plaintiffs may state cognizable Title 
VII claims on the basis of their relationships with persons belonging to any 
of the statute’s explicitly enumerated categories.81 
The majority predicated the associational discrimination portion of its 
ruling on the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, wherein 
state miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriages were struck down 
as violations of equal protection.82  The majority in Hively observed that: 
These [miscegenation] laws were long defended and understood 
as non-discriminatory because the legal obstacle affected both 
partners. The Court in Loving recognized that equal application of 
a law that prohibited conduct only between members of different 
races did not save it.  Changing the race of one partner made a 
difference in determining the legality of the conduct, and so the 
law rested on “distinctions drawn according to race,” which were 
unjustifiable and racially discriminatory.  So too, here.  If we were 
to change the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the 
outcome would be different. This reveals that the discrimination 
rests on distinctions drawn according to sex.83 
Significantly, the majority did not address the fact that whereas Loving 
entailed a constitutional challenge to racial discrimination in the context of 
marriage, Hively concerned a statutory claim of sex discrimination in the area 
of private employment.  The Seventh Circuit instead declared that the “line 
of cases [addressing associational discrimination] began with Loving” and 
then proceeded to summarize several Title VII decisions applying 
associational discrimination theory to instances of race discrimination.84  
Throughout its opinion, the majority assiduously avoided any discussion of 
how a theory originating under the Equal Protection Clause in the specific 
context of race was applicable to a claim of sex discrimination arising under 
 
 79.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 339. 
 80.  Id. at 348.  See also id. at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“Although this Circuit has not 
yet addressed whether claims based on a theory of associational discrimination are cognizable 
under Title VII, I agree with the majority that . . . [t]his type of discrimination is prohibited 
by Title VII.”). 
 81.  Id. at 349. 
 82.  388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 83.  Hively, at 348-49 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11). 
 84.  Id. at 347-48.  
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Title VII.85  This is likely because the court’s holding cannot be justified from 
a constitutional standpoint given the differential treatment afforded race and 
gender by the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.86  Rather, the 
court engaged in analytic sleight of hand by focusing instead on the coequal 
status of race and sex for the purposes of Title VII:  “The fact that Loving 
[and certain associational discrimination cases implicating Title VII] . . . 
deal[t] with racial associations, as opposed to those based on color, national 
origin, religion, or sex, is of no moment” because Title VII’s text “draws no 
distinction . . . among the different varieties of discrimination it addresses.”87 
The flaws in the majority’s rationale were laid bare in the dissenting 
opinion authored by Judge Sykes.  Regarding the issue of associational sex 
discrimination, Judge Sykes refuted a central tenet of the majority’s 
argument by rendering Loving inapposite: 
Loving rests on the inescapable truth that miscegenation laws are 
inherently racist.  They are premised on invidious ideas about 
white superiority and use racial classifications toward the end of 
racial purity and white supremacy.  Sexual-orientation 
discrimination, on the other hand, is not inherently sexist.  No one 
argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or 
perpetuate the supremacy of one sex.  In short, Loving neither 
compels nor supports the majority’s decision to upend the long-
settled understanding that sex discrimination and sexual-
orientation discrimination are distinct. 
 
For the same reason, the majority’s reliance on [precedent from 
other circuits recognizing the viability of associational 
 
 85.  See id. at 348-49 (discussing the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Loving and declaring, “[s]o too, here”).  The Supreme Court has indicated that its decisions 
construing the Equal Protection Clause “are a useful starting point in interpreting” Title VII.  
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.  See also Gutzwiller v. 
Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the showing a plaintiff must make 
to recover on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII mirrors that which must be made to 
recover on an equal protection claim under section 1983.”).  Consequently, the Supreme 
Court’s differential treatment of race and gender in the equal protection context suggests that 
courts adjudicating Title VII claims should be hesitant to extend associational discrimination 
theory beyond its historic, race-based origins to encompass matters of sex discrimination.  See 
Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 171 (2016) (acknowledging 
that under the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence “race is subject to the most 
rigorous constitutional protection” as reflected by the fact racial classifications are accorded 
strict scrutiny whereas “[s]ex is less suspect” such that classifications based on gender receive 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 86.  See supra note 85.  
 87.  Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243). 
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discrimination claims in the context of race], which translated 
Loving to the Title VII context, is entirely inapt.  An employer who 
refuses to hire or fires an employee based on his interracial 
marriage is obviously drawing invidious racial classifications akin 
to those inherent in Virginia’s miscegenation laws.  Loving’s 
equal-protection holding extends to Title VII racial-discrimination 
claims because those claims share the same contextual foundation.  
They arise in a nation whose original sin is slavery, where some 
states sought to perpetuate white supremacy as recently as half a 
century ago, and where the vestiges of this iniquitous history 
persist in our workplaces and in other institutions of our society.  
The Equal Protection Clause and Title VII’s prohibition of racial 
discrimination in the workplace both operate to curtail the evil of 
racism inherent in anti-miscegenation.  That explains why Loving 
applies to Title VII racial-discrimination claims but is not a 
warrant for reading sexual-orientation discrimination into the 
statute.88 
Judge Sykes’ dissent, thus, exposes the major flaw in the majority’s 
reasoning and highlights the difficulties LGB persons are likely to encounter 
in contesting sexual orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex 
discrimination.89  Whereas LGB plaintiffs may be tempted to draw parallels 
between discrimination on the basis of race and sex in the hope of gaining 
access to associational discrimination theory, the fact that race and sex 
discrimination are readily distinguishable,90 particularly in the constitutional 
context,91 suggests that LGB plaintiffs should be wary of advancing such 
arguments as they would only serve to undermine the litigants’ credibility 
 
 88.  Id. at 368-69.  See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. 2017) (arguing that “an employer who 
discriminates against an employee in a same-sex relationship is not engaged in sex-based 
treatment of women as inferior to similarly situated men (or vice versa), but rather is engaged 
in sex-neutral treatment of homosexual men and women alike”); Andrew Koppelman, Why 
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 
201 (1994) (explaining that “the gravamen of Loving’s objection to the miscegenation 
prohibition was that it was ‘designed to maintain White Supremacy.’”) (quoting Loving, 388 
U.S. at 11). 
 89.  See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 258 (finding that “Loving is not directly relevant to 
the argument” that sexual orientation discrimination should be actionable as a form of 
associational sex discrimination given that “Loving involved a constitutional argument, and 
sex and race are not treated identically in the constitutional context”). 
 90.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 88, at 21 (positing that 
the “analogy to racial discrimination is fundamentally inapposite”). 
 91.  See Leonore F. Carpenter, The Next Phase: Positioning the Post-Obergefell LGBT 
Rights Movement to Bridge the Gap Between Formal and Lived Equality, 13 STAN. J. CIV. 
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 255, 265 (2017) (explaining that unlike classifications on the basis of 
race and sex, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that classifications on the basis of 
sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny); supra note 85. 
REED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:10 PM 
748 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
and detract from more persuasive arguments as to why sexual orientation 
discrimination is actionable under Title VII.92 
B. Demonstrating Membership in a Protected Class 
Additionally, if history is any guide, plaintiffs seeking to contest sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination will 
have difficulty accessing the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.93  McDonnell Douglas allows plaintiffs to establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination by proving “(1) membership in a 
protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment 
action; and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on 
the basis of membership in the protected class.”94  Once a plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
“produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was 
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”95  If the employer 
satisfies this requirement, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove 
 
 92.  To date, the District of Colorado is the only federal district court to explicitly apply 
associational discrimination theory in a setting other than race and did so in the context of 
discrimination on the basis of national origin rather than sex.  Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. Sch. Dist., 
618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985).  The court begins by noting, “the EEOC has found that 
reasonable cause existed to believe that an employer violated Title VII by discharging an 
employee because of his or her association with people of a different race” and references two 
Commission decisions standing for that proposition.  Id. at 1460 (citing EEOC Decision No. 
71-1902, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1244 (1971) and EEOC Decision No. 71-909, 3 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 269 (1970)).  Without citing any additional authority or providing 
any further explanation, however, the court then characterizes these decisions as “indicat[ing] 
that the EEOC interprets Title VII as prohibiting discriminatory employment practices based 
on an individual’s association with people of a particular race or national origin.”  Id.  Thus, 
in failing to elucidate how the Commission’s rulings in the area of associational race 
discrimination support its conclusion that claims of national origin-based associational 
discrimination are actionable under Title VII, the court declined to try to situate associational 
discrimination theory within the broader framework of Title VII. 
 93.  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 94.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).  See also McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802 (articulating the Supreme Court framework requiring that a plaintiff show:  
“(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant’s qualifications”). 
  But see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by 
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 202 (2009) (recognizing that “the original McDonnell 
Douglas formulation was so fact-specific that it has applied to almost no actual cases”).  
 95.  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (quoting Tex. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). 
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that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual.96  As noted by Victoria 
Schwartz, “[g]iven this framework, the first prong of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case — the ability to establish membership in a protected class — holds 
the key to the entire burden-shifting kingdom,”97 and it is here that plaintiffs 
contesting sexual orientation discrimination as associational sex 
discrimination are likely to have their claims derailed in a manner analogous 
to the first plaintiffs alleging associational discrimination in the context of 
race. 
Courts confronted with allegations of associational race discrimination 
once routinely dismissed such claims on the grounds that the Caucasian 
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the first prong of McDonnell Douglas, i.e., 
membership in a protected class.98  These courts regarded Caucasian 
plaintiffs’ allegations of associational race discrimination as attempts to 
establish a prima facie case, not based on the plaintiffs’ own protected class 
status, but instead based on the protected class status of their African-
American associates.99  This understanding is revealed in various statements 
to the effect that “[p]laintiff does not contend that he has been discriminated 
against because of ‘his’ race” but instead “contends that he has been 
discriminated against because of the race of his wife,”100 and “plaintiff’s 
complaint does not allege that he was denied employment because of his 
race” but “because he is married to a black female.”101  Although today it is 
generally understood that “an employer may violate Title VII if it takes 
action against an employee because of the employee’s association with a 
person of another race,”102 courts adjudicating LGB plaintiffs’ claims of 
associational sex discrimination may default to the reasoning of these earlier 
cases and hold that LGB plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first prong of 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Indeed, courts have already demonstrated a willingness to dismiss 
otherwise viable claims of associational sex discrimination brought by 
 
 96.  Ricci, 530 F.3d at 110. 
 97.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 215. 
 98.  See, e.g., Adams v. Governor’s Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A, 
1981 WL 27101, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981) (stating that “[p]laintiff does not contend that 
he has been discriminated against because of ‘his’ race” as a Caucasian person, rather “[h]e 
contends that he has been discriminated against because of the race of his [African-American] 
wife”).  
 99.  Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and 
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 948 (2007); Noah D. Zatz, 
Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. 
L. J. 63, 100 (2002). 
 100.  Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3. 
 101.  Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. C-83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 
June 15, 1983). 
 102.  Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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heterosexual men on the grounds that they failed to establish membership in 
a protected class.  In Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC, the court characterized 
the plaintiff’s claim of associational sex discrimination as follows:  “Because 
[p]laintiff, a white male, is not a member of a protected class, he attempts to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination through his association with 
Ms. Risica,” a female co-worker with whom the plaintiff had become 
romantically involved.103  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he had been 
harassed by a male supervisor because he was dating a woman to whom the 
supervisor was sexually attracted.104  The court ultimately found that “[t]he 
facts relied upon by [p]laintiff have nothing to do with his gender, but rather, 
revolve around his relationship with Risica, and, in turn, her relationship with 
[the supervisor].”105  Consequently, the court granted summary judgment for 
the defendant on the grounds the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was 
harassed because of “his own gender” and therefore could not satisfy the first 
prong of McDonnell Douglas.106 
The fact that heterosexual plaintiffs have struggled to state viable 
associational discrimination claims on the basis of sex does not bode well 
for LGB individuals seeking to contest sexual orientation bias as a form of 
associational sex discrimination.  Historically, when confronted with LGB 
persons’ otherwise actionable claims of sex discrimination, courts have 
seized on the plaintiffs’ same-sex attraction as proof that, in reality, plaintiffs 
were attempting to bootstrap sexual orientation protection into Title VII.107  
This trend is likely to continue in the context of LGB persons’ claims of 
associational sex discrimination.  Indeed, whereas in Stezzi the court made 
no mention of the parties’ respective sexual orientations but instead simply 
assumed that all of the parties were heterosexual,108 a court adjudicating a 
claim of associational sex discrimination brought by an openly LGB person 
would likely be “hyperaware” of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.109  
Presumably, this would lead the court to abstain from the sort of detailed — 
albeit questionable — analysis set forth in Stezzi in favor of summarily 
rejecting the plaintiff’s claim as an attempt to amend Title VII by judicial 
fiat.110 
If such a claim were to receive a court’s reasoned consideration, 
moreover, the result would likely be the same as in Stezzi or any of the early 
 
 103.  No. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2009). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at *5. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Alex Reed, Redressing LGBT Employment Discrimination via Executive Order, 29 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 133, 155 (2015). 
 108.  Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4-5. 
 109.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 211. 
 110.  Id. at 211, 255. 
REED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:10 PM 
2018] ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION THEORY 751 
 
associational race discrimination cases.  If, for example, a man was to bring 
a Title VII claim against his employer alleging that he had been fired for 
marrying another man, a court might well reject his claim on the grounds he 
“does not contend that he has been discriminated against because of ‘his’ 
[sex]” but instead “contends that he has been discriminated against because 
of the [sex] of his [spouse].”111  Even if the plaintiff took pains to characterize 
his claim as alleging discrimination on the basis of his own sex, male, when 
viewed in relation to the sex of his male spouse, a court might nonetheless 
seize on his spouse’s alleged gender nonconforming appearance or behavior 
to hold that “[t]he facts relied upon by [p]laintiff have nothing to do with his 
gender, but rather, revolve around his relationship with [his same-sex 
spouse], and, in turn,”112 his same-sex spouse’s alleged failure to comport 
with male gender norms.113 
Additionally, LGB plaintiffs’ ability to establish a prima facie case may 
depend on the sex of the associator and associatee.  In the preceding 
hypothetical wherein the plaintiff and spouse are both men, a court might 
begin its analysis by noting that “[b]ecause Plaintiff, a . . . male, is not a 
member of a protected class, he attempts to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination through his association with [his spouse].”114  The court 
presumably would then observe that in this case, however, the relevant 
associatee is also male such that the plaintiff cannot rely on his spouse’s sex 
to establish membership in a protected class.  A court adjudicating a case of 
this sort would likely stress that whereas prior associational discrimination 
claims have been characterized by an associator of a different race or sex 
than the relevant associatee, here the plaintiff and spouse are both men.115  
Although this distinction would apply with equal force if the associator and 
associatee were both female, a court may be more inclined to permit a claim 
of associational sex discrimination by a lesbian given that she would likely 
 
 111.  Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3. 
 112.  Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *5. 
 113.  This scenario presumably would not constitute associational sex discrimination 
given that the plaintiff’s sex is not being considered in relation to the sex of his spouse, but 
rather the spouse’s sex is being considered independent of and without reference to the 
plaintiff’s own sex. 
 114.  Stezzi, 2009 WL 2356866, at *4. 
 115.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, Public 
Advocate of the United States, and United States Justice Foundation in Support of Appellees 
and Affirmance at 11, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. July 26, 2017)  
(“In the race case, the associational theory applies only to an employee who is 
associated with a person of another or different race, whereas in the sex case, the 
associational theory is applied only when the person is in a relationship with a 
person of the same sex . . . Thus, the two cases are not analogous.”).   
See also Clark, supra note 18, at 329-31 (observing that employment discrimination on the 
basis of interracial or opposite-sex relationships is actionable under Title VII). 
REED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  4:10 PM 
752 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
be deemed a member of a protected class both in her own right and in relation 
to her female spouse.  While the logic underlying the foregoing analysis is 
admittedly tortured, history suggests that such holdings are not only possible 
but indeed probable based on courts’ initial reluctance to allow claims of 
associational race discrimination by Caucasians and more recent hesitance 
to permit claims of associational sex discrimination by heterosexuals.116 
LGB plaintiffs, therefore, should be wary of contesting sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination for 
two reasons.  First, courts adjudicating LGB plaintiffs’ claims of 
associational sex discrimination may invoke the reasoning of the early 
associational race discrimination cases to deny LGB plaintiffs access to the 
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas.  Second, even if courts 
are otherwise receptive to sex-based associational discrimination claims, 
LGB plaintiffs’ ability to establish a prima facie case may hinge on the sex 
of the relevant associator and associatee. 
C. Proving a Sufficiently Substantial Relationship 
Contesting sexual orientation bias as a form of associational sex 
discrimination is also problematic from the standpoint that it promises to be 
under-inclusive.  To date, most of the cases finding an actionable claim of 
associational discrimination have centered on relationships of a romantic or 
familial nature between an associator and a specific associatee.117  Should 
this trend carry over into the sexual orientation context, persons 
discriminated against solely on the basis of their sexual orientation — 
whether heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual — would be left without any 
recourse under Title VII given that the discrimination they suffered was 
ostensibly status-based rather than the result of their intimate association 
with an individual of a particular sex.118  This would have the practical effect 
 
 116.  See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
101, 107 (2017) (“Protected class reasoning must be overcome for the view that anti-LGBT 
discrimination is sex discrimination to gain wide acceptance.”). 
 117.  Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513.  See also Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of 
Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. REV. 605, 646 (2017) (“[F]ew jurisdictions will recognize the claim 
where the association is a strong coworker relationship rather than a family relationship.”). 
 118.  See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258-60 (Pryor, J., concurring) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
contention that “a person who experiences discrimination because of sexual orientation 
necessarily experiences discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes” after 
concluding that “a claim of gender nonconformity is a behavior-based claim, not a status-
based claim”).  But see Schwartz, supra note 20, at 249 (arguing that “[a]n employer who is 
motivated by animus based on an employee’s sexual orientation likely is so motivated 
regardless of the specific status of that employee’s relationships” such that the employee 
should be permitted to state a viable claim of associational sex discrimination on the basis of 
her LGB status alone). 
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of conferring privileged status on persons known by their coworkers to be in 
sexual orientation-consistent relationships at the time of the alleged 
discrimination. 
LGB persons stand to be particularly vulnerable to this “singles 
loophole” given that many of them are not out at work and those who are out 
in the workplace are statistically less likely to be married than their 
heterosexual counterparts.  Studies indicate that fifty-three percent of LGB 
persons actively conceal the fact that they are homosexual or bisexual from 
their work colleagues.119  This includes disavowing romantic interest in 
persons of the same sex generally as well as hiding the fact that they are 
currently dating persons of the same sex or are in a committed relationship 
with a person of the same sex specifically.120  Despite their best efforts, 
however, these persons may still be suspected of being homosexual or 
bisexual and find themselves subjected to discrimination on that basis.121  
Associational discrimination theory would not provide these individuals 
with a viable cause of action because the discrimination they suffered would 
have been based on their perceived sexual orientation rather than any actual 
same-sex relationships.  Given that avoiding sexual orientation-based 
discrimination is one of the most common reasons for remaining closeted in 
the workplace,122 yet acknowledging one’s same-sex relationships to one’s 
coworkers is a necessary prerequisite to stating a cognizable claim of 
associational sex discrimination, associational discrimination theory 
threatens to leave more than half of the LGB community in an intractable 
catch-22. 
Simply coming out would not guarantee LGB persons employment 
protections, however, as even individuals who are honest about their sexual 
orientation and known by their coworkers to be in a committed same-sex 
relationship may struggle to state a viable associational discrimination claim 
unless they have solemnized their relationship via a legal marriage.  
Although two circuits have held that the degree of association between an 
associator and associatee is irrelevant,123 the cases in which other circuits 
 
 119.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 16, at 9.  
 120.  Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men: A Proposal for True 
Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 60 n.51 
(1993). 
 121.  See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251 (observing that although plaintiff “did not 
broadcast her sexuality” in the workplace, her coworkers suspected she was a lesbian based 
on her failure to conform to female stereotypes and harassed her on that basis). 
 122.  Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination 
& Its Effects on LGBT People, WILLIAMS INST., 13 (July 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.uc
la.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4
YDD-U2CP]. 
 123.  Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513; Drake, 134 F.3d at 884. 
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have found an actionable claim of associational discrimination have centered 
on relatively substantial relationships such as marriage.124  Should courts 
adjudicating claims of associational sex discrimination import this 
substantiality requirement into their analyses, a valid same-sex marriage may 
be necessary to state a cognizable claim.125  Such a requirement would place 
a disproportionate burden on LGB persons given that same-sex marriage 
rates are significantly lower than opposite-sex marriage rates.  Indeed, 
whereas approximately fifty percent of adult heterosexuals are married,126 
the marriage rate for LGB adults is under ten percent.127  Thus, LGB persons 
are five times less likely than heterosexuals to be married, making it difficult 
for LGB plaintiffs to prove that their relationships are of a sufficiently 
substantial nature to sustain a claim of associational sex discrimination. 
LGB plaintiffs, therefore, should be hesitant to contest sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of associational sex discrimination for 
three reasons.  First, closeted LGB persons would be left without recourse 
since any discrimination they might suffer on the basis of their perceived 
sexual orientation would be status-based rather than the result of their 
intimate association with an individual of a particular sex.128  Second, even 
 
 124.  See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513 (“[I]n many of the cases that have found actionable 
associational discrimination, the relationship at issue has been one that extended outside the 
place of employment, such as a familial or romantic relationship.”).  See also Clark, supra 
note 18, at 334 (“[T]o state a claim of associative discrimination, a plaintiff generally must 
show a very substantial relationship with the other person that is greater than friendship.”). 
 125.  See Zielonka v. Temple Univ., No. Civ. A. 99-5693, 2001 WL 1231746, at *6 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 12, 2001) (observing that “[t]he cases in which courts have recognized a cause of 
action under Title VII [for associational discrimination] have typically involved more 
substantial relationships” such as marriage).  Significantly, whereas the panel decision in 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College noted that “[a] number of courts have found that Title 
VII protects those who have been discriminated against based on interracial friendships and 
other associations” as support for its contention that “[t]he relationship in play need not be a 
marriage to be protected,” comparable language is missing from the en banc decision.  
Compare 853 F.3d 339, 347-49 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), with 830 F.3d 698, 716 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
 126.  Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/data-trend/society-
and-demographics/marriage/ [https://perma.cc/Z766-VHSX] (last visited Aug. 2, 2017). 
 127.  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriages Up One Year After Supreme Court 
Verdict, GALLUP (June 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/193055/sex-marriages-one-
year-supreme-court-verdict.aspx [https://perma.cc/8G3C-7U3Q] (observing that the 
percentage of LGBT adults in same-sex marriages increased from 7.9% in the first half of 
2015 to 9.6% in the second half of 2015 but then essentially remained unchanged at 9.5% as 
of June 2016, “suggest[ing] there was a burst of same-sex marriages in the first few months 
after the Supreme Court ruling [legalizing same-sex marriage] but little additional increase 
since then”). 
 128.  See Brief of the Defendant-Appellee Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind. at 19, Hively v. 
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1720) (“Factually, there is nothing 
in the District Court record suggesting that [plaintiff] associated with anyone — regardless of 
race, gender, sexual orientation, or otherwise.  Thus, there is no basis for any sort of 
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if they are out to their coworkers, single LGB persons would be unable to 
attain relief given that they were not in a same-sex relationship at the time of 
the alleged discrimination.  Third, LGB persons known by their coworkers 
to be in committed same-sex relationships may be unable to state a viable 
claim of associational sex discrimination unless they have solemnized their 
relationship via a legal marriage.129 
The existence of two other compelling, comparatively straightforward 
arguments as to why discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
constitutes actionable sex discrimination only serves to underscore the 
severity of the associational-discrimination route’s flaws.  Unlike 
associational discrimination theory, moreover, these alternative arguments 
stand to protect all LGB persons, not just those fortunate enough to be in 
committed same-sex relationships at the time of the alleged discrimination.130  
Because the inclusion of associational discrimination theory threatens to 
undermine these other arguments’ strength and introduce unnecessary 
confusion into courts’ analyses, the EEOC and LGB plaintiffs should rely 
exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes as discussed in 
greater detail in Part IV. 
IV. THE BUT-FOR AND GENDER-STEREOTYPING ROUTES AS 
PREFERRED MEANS OF SECURING LGB EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTIONS 
The associational-discrimination route is not the only means of 
contesting sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.  Rather, it is but 
one of three routes by which persons discriminated against on the basis of 
sexual orientation may establish a cognizable claim of sex discrimination.  
The remaining routes rely on established Supreme Court precedent to show 
that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination in that 
“it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the 
employee’s sex”131 in contravention of Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power v. Manhart;132 and “it necessarily involves discrimination based on 
 
associational claim here.”). 
 129.  See supra pp. 22-23 and notes 124-25. 
 130.  See En Banc Brief of Christian Legal Soc’y & Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 12, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) (“It would be a large stretch . . . to a new rule 
barring discrimination based on merely hypothetical relationships, and it would be highly 
undesirable to create a situation under which a court would have to enquire whether the 
plaintiff actually was in — and the defendant actually knew about — a relationship with an 
individual of the same sex.”). 
 131.  Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5. 
 132.  435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (“Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether 
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gender stereotypes”133 in violation of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.134  
Because the inclusion of associational discrimination claims stands to 
undermine the legitimacy of these latter routes — while at the same time 
affording courts hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to recognize claims 
of associational sex discrimination only to then construe such claims 
narrowly in a manner precluding relief135 — the EEOC and private litigants 
should abandon the associational-discrimination route as a means of 
contesting anti-LGB employment bias. 
A. The But-For Route136 
The simplest, most direct means of demonstrating that sexual 
orientation discrimination constitutes actionable sex discrimination is via the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Manhart.137  There, the Court articulated a “simple 
test” for evaluating claims of sex discrimination:  “[W]hether the evidence 
shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex 
would be different.’”138  Over the past forty years, the Court has invoked the 
but-for route to find actionable sex discrimination in a variety of contexts, 
including circumstances where employers require female employees to make 
 
the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would 
be different.’”) (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 133.  Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7. 
 134.  490 U.S. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group . . . .”). 
 135.  See supra note 65. 
 136.  To be clear, “but-for causation is not the test” in archetypal Title VII cases where 
“[i]t suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s 
motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the 
employer’s decision.”  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013).  The 
author’s decision to refer to this method as the “but-for route” should not be interpreted as 
advocating for the imposition of a more demanding causation standard for sexual orientation-
based discrimination claims, but rather reflects a desire to utilize terminology consistent with 
the standard as articulated by the EEOC.  See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10 (“An 
employee could show that the sexual orientation discrimination he or she experienced was 
sex discrimination because it involved treatment that would not have occurred but for the 
individual’s sex.”).  See also Brief of Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 5 n.4, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) (“While a plaintiff satisfying Manhart’s ‘but-
for’ test necessarily satisfies Title VII’s causation requirement, Title VII plaintiffs may also 
prevail based on ‘the less stringent “motivating-factor” test.’”) (quoting Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2017)). 
 137.  435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 138.  Id. at 711 (emphasis added) (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)).  
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larger pension contributions than their male peers,139 provide married male 
employees with health insurance coverage for dependents that is less 
inclusive than the dependency coverage furnished to married female 
employees,140 and implement fetal protection policies barring women of 
childbearing age from certain jobs.141  Thus, whereas the associational 
discrimination theory has never been recognized by the Supreme Court in 
any context, race or otherwise, the but-for route has its origins in the Court’s 
sex discrimination jurisprudence and has been reaffirmed by the Court on 
numerous occasions. 
The appeal of the but-for route as a means of contesting sexual 
orientation discrimination is evidenced by the fact that, unlike associational 
discrimination theory, it had already been embraced by several courts prior 
to receiving the EEOC’s endorsement in Baldwin.142  The first and most 
significant of these decisions was issued by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon in 2002.143  There, the employer moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds the discrimination was predicated on the plaintiff’s 
sexual orientation rather than her sex, as reflected by her supervisor’s 
repeated use of the terms “fag” and “homo” when referring to the plaintiff.144  
Whereas most courts of this era would have seized on the sexual orientation-
related aspects of the case to conclude that the lesbian plaintiff was 
attempting to bootstrap sexual orientation protection into Title VII,145 neither 
the plaintiff’s acknowledged homosexuality nor the defendant’s use of anti-
gay slurs prevented the court from considering whether the plaintiff had 
adduced sufficient evidence to support a claim of sex discrimination.146  In 
 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683-84 
(1983). 
 141.  UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991). 
 142.  See Hall v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-2160, 2014 WL 4719007, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
Sept. 22, 2014) (“Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment based on his sex, not his sexual 
orientation, specifically that he (as a male who married a male) was treated differently in 
comparison to his female coworkers who also married males.”); Heller v. Columbia 
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Or. 2002) (“A jury could find that 
[the supervisor] would not have acted as she (allegedly) did if Plaintiff were a man dating a 
woman, instead of a woman dating a woman.  If that is so, then Plaintiff was discriminated 
against because of her gender.”).  See also Foray v. Bell Atl., 56 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329-30 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (observing that the gay “[p]laintiff’s chief argument, that ‘but for’ his sex, 
he would not have been discriminated against, is supported by legal theorists and [related state 
case law],” but dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim because he was unable to show that he 
had been “treated differently from ‘similarly situated’ persons of the opposite sex”). 
 143.  Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16. 
 144.  Id. at 1216-18, 1222. 
 145.  See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality & Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 207 
n.17 (2009) (collecting cases). 
 146.  Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23. 
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denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court held that “[a] 
jury could find that [the supervisor] would not have acted as she (allegedly) 
did if [p]laintiff were a man dating a woman, instead of a woman dating a 
woman,” in which case the plaintiff “was discriminated against because of 
her gender.”147  Having received the backing of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Oregon, the but-for route was subsequently adopted by the 
District of Washington in 2014148 and the EEOC in 2015.149 
The but-for route’s popularity has only grown following the EEOC’s 
ruling in Baldwin.150  Significantly, several courts embracing the route post-
Baldwin have done so in a footnote or string citation rather than in the main 
body of the opinion.151  These courts seem to regard the route’s applicability 
as a foregone conclusion not warranting detailed analysis.  Similarly, some 
courts have adopted the but-for route without citing to any legal authority for 
support, apparently perceiving the route as following naturally from the 
statutory text.152  Thus, the somewhat perfunctory manner in which courts 
have gone about recognizing the but-for route within the past few years 
suggests the route is increasingly viewed as an obvious, non-controversial 
means by which LGB persons may contest instances of sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
Of the cases to embrace the but-for route within the last few years, none 
is more significant than the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Hively.153  There, the Seventh Circuit adopted the but-for route in three 
succinct sentences: 
 
 147.  Id. at 1223. 
 148.  Hall, 2014 WL 4719007, at *3. 
 149.  Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5. 
 150.  See Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (“This court agrees . . . with the view of the 
[EEOC] that claims of sexual orientation-based discrimination are cognizable under Title 
VII.”).  See also Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 203-04 (Katzmann, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that ‘but for’ their sex they would not have been 
discriminated against for being attracted to men (or being attracted to women), they have 
made out a cognizable sex discrimination claim.”) (citation omitted); Evans, 850 F.3d at 1271 
n.16 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (“When an employer discriminates against a woman because 
she is sexually attracted to women but does not discriminate against a man because he is 
sexually attracted to women, the employer treats women and men differently ‘because of . . . 
sex.’”); Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(demonstrating a Title IX case which relies on Title VII law to hold that “Plaintiffs have stated 
a straightforward claim of sex discrimination under Title IX” because “[i]f Plaintiffs had been 
males dating females, instead of females dating females, they would not have been subjected 
to the alleged different treatment”). 
 151.  Isaacs, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1194; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1271 n.16 (Rosenbaum, J., 
dissenting). 
 152.  See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1265 n.9 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (failing to cite 
legal authority for the but-for route). 
 153.  853 F.3d at 339. 
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Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or 
living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had 
stayed the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her 
and would not have fired her . . . This describes paradigmatic sex 
discrimination . . . Ivy Tech is disadvantaging her because she is a 
woman.154 
Compared to the rationale accompanying the court’s endorsement of 
the associational-discrimination route,155 the analysis accompanying its 
adoption of the but-for route is both concise and coherent.  Consequently, 
Hively is significant to the extent it highlights both the associational-
discrimination route’s weaknesses as well as the but-for route’s strengths. 
Given the but-for route’s appeal both before and after Baldwin, as most 
recently exemplified by Hively, courts will likely be more receptive to the 
but-for route as a means by which LGB persons may contest sexual 
orientation-based employment bias than to the associational-discrimination 
route.  Unlike associational discrimination theory, application of the but-for 
route to instances of sexual orientation discrimination does not require the 
doctrine’s expansion beyond its historic origins.  Nor is the but-for route 
encumbered by precedent potentially restricting the doctrine’s scope to 
persons in committed romantic relationships or by otherwise limiting 
persons’ ability to access the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell 
Douglas.  Rather, the but-for route requires only a literal application of the 
“simple test” announced in Manhart:  “[W]hether the evidence shows 
‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be 
different.’”156  
B. The Gender-Stereotyping Route 
Whereas the but-for route arguably represents the simplest and most 
direct means of contesting sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII, 
the gender-stereotyping route is the method most likely to be embraced by 
 
 154.  Id. at 345. 
 155.  See supra pp. 14-16. 
 156.  435 U.S. at 711 (quoting Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  See 
also Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5  
(“[A]ssume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a photo 
of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for 
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk.  The lesbian employee in 
that example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that 
the employer would not have taken had she been male.”); 
 Koppelman, supra note 88, at 208 (“If a business fires Ricky . . . because of his sexual 
activities with Fred, while these actions would not be taken against Lucy if she did exactly 
the same things with Fred, then Ricky is being discriminated against because of his sex.”). 
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courts.157  The gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination has its 
origins in Price Waterhouse, wherein the Supreme Court famously declared: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for “in forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”158 
Because employers discriminating against LGB persons on the belief 
that men should be attracted exclusively to women and women should be 
attracted exclusively to men are, at bottom, insisting that LGB persons match 
the stereotype associated with their sex, Price Waterhouse dictates that 
sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination for the purposes of 
Title VII.159  Although LGB persons advancing this argument historically 
have enjoyed limited success,160 courts are increasingly inclined to construe 
the gender-stereotyping theory as prohibiting discrimination against sexual 
minorities.161 
The appeal of the gender-stereotyping route as a means of contesting 
sexual orientation discrimination is evidenced by the fact that — unlike 
associational discrimination theory — it had already been embraced by 
several courts prior to receiving the EEOC’s endorsement in Baldwin v. 
Foxx.162  The most noteworthy of these pre-Baldwin decisions was issued by 
 
 157.  Unlike the associational-discrimination and but-for routes, the gender-stereotyping 
route has not been explicitly rejected by any court following the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin. 
See Smith v. City of Pleasant Grove, No. 2:16-cv-00373-JEO, 2016 WL 5868510, at *6 n.4 
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2016) (rejecting the associational-discrimination route); Winstead v. 
Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1344 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (rejecting 
the but-for route). 
 158.  490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13). 
 159.  See Zachary A. Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
Conforming and Gender Non-Conforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
465, 479 (2004) (“No longer constrained to only sex-based claims, Hopkins enabled plaintiffs 
to raise gender-based claims [under Title VII] that focus instead on an employer’s 
stereotypical conceptions of the sexes.”). 
 160.  Reed, supra note 2, at 291-94. 
 161.  See Reed, supra note 65, at 853-55 (observing courts are increasingly likely to regard 
discrimination against transgender persons as actionable sex discrimination). 
 162.  See Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds the plaintiff, a gay man, stated a cognizable 
claim of sex discrimination by alleging that his “sexual orientation is not consistent with the 
Defendant’s perception of acceptable gender roles”); Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No. 
3:13CV1303, 2014 WL 4794527, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2014) (holding that a lesbian 
plaintiff “has set forth a plausible claim she was discriminated against based on her non-
conforming gender behavior” to the extent she “stated that the discriminatory conduct 
commenced after certain individuals became aware of her sexual orientation and that she was 
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the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 2014.163  There, the 
employer moved to dismiss a gay man’s gender-stereotyping claim on the 
grounds the plaintiff failed to allege that his “supervisor’s [discriminatory] 
conduct was motivated by judgments about plaintiff’s behavior, demeanor 
or appearance” and because there were “no facts to support an allegation that 
the employer was motivated by his views about [p]laintiff’s conformity (or 
lack thereof) with sex stereotypes.”164  In denying the motion, the court held 
that the plaintiff met his pleading burden by alleging that he was “a 
homosexual male whose sexual orientation is not consistent with the 
[d]efendant’s perception of acceptable gender roles” such that his “status as 
a homosexual male did not conform to the [d]efendant’s gender stereotypes 
associated with men.”165  This marked the first time that an LGB person’s 
gender-stereotyping claim was able to withstand a motion to dismiss where 
the plaintiff’s allegations focused exclusively on his status as a homosexual 
rather than his observable behavior or appearance in the workplace.166 
 
subjected to sexual stereotyping during her employment on the basis of her sexual 
orientation”); Heller, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (“[A] jury could find that [the supervisor] 
repeatedly harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller did not conform to [the 
supervisor’s] stereotype of how a woman ought to behave.  Heller is attracted to and dates 
other women, whereas [the supervisor] believes that a woman should be attracted to and date 
only men.”).  
 163.  Terveer, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 116. 
 164.  Id. at 115-16. 
 165.  Id. at 116. 
 166.  Kerry Eleveld, Title VII Awakening, ADVOCATE (July 15, 2014), http://www.advoc
ate.com/print-issue/current-issue/2014/07/15/title-vii-awakening [https://perma.cc/6CFE-CK
SS]. 
  Several circuit courts and numerous district courts have held that the gender-
stereotyping theory affords protection to LGB persons who are discriminated against on the 
basis of their gender nonconforming appearance or behavior as observed in the workplace.  
See Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 201 (finding that plaintiff, an openly gay man, stated a 
cognizable claim of sex discrimination by alleging that he was perceived as “effeminate and 
submissive” by his coworkers and harassed on that basis); Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254-55 
(granting a lesbian plaintiff leave to amend her complaint so that she may “provide enough 
factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present herself in a masculine manner 
led to the alleged adverse employment actions”); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 
285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for defendant on the grounds plaintiff, 
an openly gay man, presented sufficient evidence of gender stereotyping-based harassment to 
the extent plaintiff “acknowledged that he has a high voice and walks in an effeminate 
manner” and “discussed things like art, music, interior design, and décor” with his coworkers). 
  These courts often note that LGB persons’ failure to conform to gender stereotypes 
vis-à-vis their romantic partners cannot give rise to a cognizable Title VII claim.  See, e.g., 
Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 201 (“[B]eing gay, lesbian, or bisexual, standing alone, does not 
constitute nonconformity with a gender stereotype that can give rise to a cognizable gender 
stereotyping claim.”).  See also Thompson v. CHI Health Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 
8:16CV160, 2016 WL 5394691, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 27, 2016) (“While a significant amount 
of case law following Price [Waterhouse v. Hopkins] included the discrimination of gay or 
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Application of the gender-stereotyping route has increased dramatically 
following the EEOC’s ruling in Baldwin v. Foxx.167  Several courts adopting 
the route post-Baldwin have sought to expand upon the EEOC’s contention 
that sexual orientation discrimination necessarily entails discrimination on 
the basis of gender stereotypes.  Specifically, these courts have shown that 
attempts to draw distinctions between an LGB individual’s gender-
nonconforming status and gender-nonconforming behavior are unworkable 
from a practical, textual, and doctrinal standpoint such that discrimination 
predicated on a person’s LGB status is — by itself — sufficient to sustain a 
 
lesbian plaintiffs, these types of claims are only successful if the plaintiffs can carve out 
discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes from discrimination based upon their sexual 
orientation.”). 
  Nevertheless, the fact that these courts have demonstrated a willingness to entertain 
sex discrimination claims brought by LGB persons suggests that they and other courts may 
be inclined to adopt the EEOC’s more expansive view that “[s]exual orientation 
discrimination . . . necessarily involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes.”  Baldwin 
v. Foxx, No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).  Indeed, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed to rehear a case en banc to determine whether 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is actionable under Title VII as a form of sex 
discrimination.  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017). 
 167.  See Winstead v. Lafayette Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1346 (N.D. 
Fla. 2016) (“This view — that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is necessarily 
discrimination based on gender or sex stereotypes, and is therefore sex discrimination — is 
persuasive to this Court, as it has been to numerous other courts and the EEOC.”); Scott Med. 
Health Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 842 (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a 
subset of sexual stereotyping and thus covered by Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination 
‘because of sex.’”); Isaacs v. Felder Servs., LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1194 (M.D. Ala. 
2015)  
(“To the extent that sexual orientation discrimination occurs not because of the 
targeted individual’s romantic or sexual attraction to or involvement with people 
of the same sex, but rather based on her or his perceived deviations from 
‘heterosexually defined gender norms,’ this, too, is sex discrimination, of the 
gender-stereotyping variety.” (quoting Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641, at *7-8)). 
See also Christiansen, 852 F.3d at 206 (Katzmann, C.J., dissenting)  
(“Thus, in my view, if gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that they were 
discriminated against for failing to comply with some gender stereotype, 
including the stereotype that men should be exclusively attracted to women and 
women should be exclusively attracted to men, they have made out a cognizable 
sex discrimination claim.”); 
Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) 
(“Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as [plaintiff] has, that she has been 
discriminated against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges that she has 
been discriminated against because she failed to conform to the employer’s image 
of what women should be — specifically, that women should be sexually 
attracted to men only.”); 
Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[D]iscrimination 
based on gender stereotyping encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.”). 
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gender stereotyping claim.168  Similarly, the emerging consensus that 
discrimination against transgender persons is, by definition, discrimination 
on the basis of gender stereotypes has been shown to apply with equal force 
in the sexual orientation context such that anti-LGB bias, like anti-trans bias, 
is invariably predicated on gender stereotypes.169 
Of the cases recognizing the gender-stereotyping route within the last 
few years, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hively v. Ivy 
Tech Community College once again proves the most significant.170  There, 
the majority relied exclusively on Title VII precedent to justify its adoption 
of the gender-stereotyping route: 
Viewed through the lens of the gender non-conformity line of 
cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to 
the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as 
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and 
other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.  
Our panel described the line between a gender nonconformity 
claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we 
conclude that it does not exist at all.  Hively’s claim is no different 
from the claims brought by women who were rejected for jobs in 
traditionally male workplaces, such as fire departments, 
construction, and policing.  The employers in those cases were 
policing the boundaries of what jobs or behaviors they found 
acceptable for a woman (or in some cases, for a man). 
 
This was the critical point that the Supreme Court was making in 
[Price Waterhouse v.] Hopkins . . . And even before Hopkins, 
courts had found sex discrimination in situations where women 
were resisting stereotypical roles.  As far back as 1971, the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII does not permit an employer to 
refuse to hire women with pre-school-age children, but not men.  
Around the same time, [the Seventh Circuit] held that Title VII 
“strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes” and struck down a rule 
requiring only the female employees to be unmarried.  In both 
those instances, the employer’s rule did not affect every woman in 
the workforce.  Just so here: a policy that discriminates on the basis 
of sexual orientation does not affect every woman, or every man, 
but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for 
someone of a given sex.  The discriminatory behavior does not 
 
 168.  E.g., Winstead, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1345-46.  See also Evans, 850 F.3d at 1267-68 
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
 169.  Id. at 1265-69; Winstead, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 1345-46.  
 170.  853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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exist without taking the victim’s biological sex (either as observed 
at birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals) into account.  
Any discomfort, disapproval, or job decision based on the fact that 
the complainant — woman or man — dresses differently, speaks 
differently, or dates or marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction 
purely and simply based on sex.  That means that it falls within 
Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, if it affects 
employment in one of the specified ways.171 
Compared to the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for endorsing the 
associational-discrimination route,172 the analysis accompanying the court’s 
adoption of the gender-stereotyping route is both logical and coherent.  Thus, 
Hively is significant to the extent it highlights both the gender-stereotyping 
route’s strengths and the associational-discrimination route’s weaknesses. 
In light of the gender-stereotyping route’s popularity both before and 
after Baldwin — as most recently illustrated by Hively — courts will likely 
be more receptive to the gender-stereotyping route as a means by which LGB 
persons may contest sexual orientation-based employment discrimination 
than they would the associational-discrimination route.  Compared to 
associational discrimination theory, application of the gender-stereotyping 
route to instances of sexual orientation discrimination does not require the 
doctrine’s expansion beyond its historic origins.  Nor is the gender-
stereotyping route burdened by precedent potentially restricting the 
doctrine’s scope to persons in committed romantic relationships or otherwise 
limiting persons’ ability to access the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas.  Rather, the route merely requires recognition of the 
fact that LGB persons contravene the “ultimate gender stereotype,”173 i.e., 
opposite-sex attraction. 
CONCLUSION 
On September 26, 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals convened 
a rare en banc sitting to hear argument on the following question: “Does Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation through its prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . 
sex’?”174  Whereas to date the appellant/employee has relied on the 
associational-discrimination route to prove that the anti-LGB bias he 
 
 171.  Id. at 346-47 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1971)). 
 172.  See supra pp. 33-41. 
 173.  Kramer, supra note 159, at 490. 
 174.  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017) (granting en 
banc review). 
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endured constitutes actionable sex discrimination,175 this article contends that 
he should abandon the associational-discrimination route in favor of 
proceeding under the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes. 
The associational-discrimination route’s flaws are apparent from a 
review of the appellant’s own legal briefs.  Specifically, the appellant 
acknowledges that the Second Circuit first recognized claims of 
associational race discrimination in the 2008 case of Holcomb v. Iona 
College and then declares, “Holcomb is this Court’s Baldwin [v. Foxx], 
dressed in the language of race.  Extend Holcomb to same-sex partners and 
[circuit precedent holding that sexual orientation discrimination is not 
actionable under Title VII] is dead.”176  Consequently, the appellant is asking 
the court to untether associational discrimination theory from its racial 
moorings, expand the theory to include associational discrimination on the 
basis of sex, and then interpret associational sex discrimination as precluding 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  For a circuit that only 
recently embraced associational discrimination theory in the specific context 
of race, this argument will likely prove a bridge too far. 
Second, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in its application 
of McDonnell Douglas.  According to the appellant, whether a prima facie 
case of discrimination has been established — so as to then shift the burden 
to the employer to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the contested action — is a question of law for the trial judge such 
that it was error for the court to have entrusted that responsibility to the 
jury.177  Had the jury not been involved in this determination, however, the 
trial judge may still have defaulted to the reasoning of the early associational 
race discrimination cases and held that the appellant was unable to satisfy 
the first element of McDonnell Douglas, i.e., membership in a protected 
class.  Specifically, the trial judge may have concluded that, as a man, the 
appellant cannot establish membership in a protected class either in his own 
right or derivatively via the protected class status of his romantic associates. 
Third, the appellant asserts that he was terminated after acknowledging 
his homosexuality to his coworkers — a necessary prerequisite to invoking 
the associational-discrimination route, and yet because he was not at that 
time married to a person of the same sex, the Second Circuit may well 
conclude that he cannot state a viable claim of associational sex 
discrimination.  Although other circuits have held that the degree of 
 
 175.  Appellant’s Brief at 33-35, 38, 48, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775); Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, 13-14, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775). 
 176.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 175, at 48. 
 177.  Id. at 43. 
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association between an associator and associatee is irrelevant,178 the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Holcomb centered on the most substantial of all 
relationships: marriage.179  Thus, the fact that the appellant and his same-sex 
partner separated before he began working for the appellee180 may lead the 
Second Circuit to find that, as a single person, he is unable to state a 
cognizable claim of associational sex discrimination. 
Unlike associational discrimination theory, the but-for and gender-
stereotyping routes are grounded in Supreme Court precedent and have their 
origins in the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.  Because the 
inclusion of associational discrimination claims will only serve to undermine 
these other arguments’ strength while at the same time affording courts 
hostile to LGB equality an opportunity to curtail the associational-
discrimination route’s efficacy via narrow, fact-restricted rulings, the 
appellant in Zarda v. Altitude Express — together with the EEOC181 — 
should rely exclusively on the but-for and gender-stereotyping routes to 
show that the anti-LGB bias he suffered constitutes actionable sex 
discrimination under Title VII. 
 
 
 178.  See Barrett, 556 F.3d at 513; Drake, 134 F.3d at 884. 
 179.  Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139. 
 180.  Joint Appendix – Volume I at 141, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775); Joint Appendix – Volume II at 570, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775).   
 181.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals invited the EEOC “to brief and argue this case 
as amicus curiae.”  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 31, 2017).  In 
its brief, the EEOC continues to advance the associational-discrimination route as a means of 
demonstrating that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination constitutes 
actionable sex discrimination under Title VII.  En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of 
Reversal at 10-13, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. June 23, 2017). 
